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Abstract: This article explores how the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom (and the House of Lords) has generally appealed to four forms of 
constitutional arguments when interpreting the Human Rights Act 1998: 
(i) textual arguments, (ii) historical arguments, (iii) precedential 
arguments, and (iv) consequentialist arguments. The author will also 
illustrate how the various types of constitutional arguments are 
substantially interdependent and interrelated, such that they often dovetail 
with one another to reach a reasonably coherent and defensible legal 
result. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) has been in force since 2000; and naturally, in 
view of this statutory development, we have witnessed in the last decade a burgeoning 
discourse on the record of the House of Lords and its succeeding body, the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom, on rights-adjudication. The academic debate has 
however focused primarily on three key areas: (i) the relationship between Strasbourg 
jurisprudence and English case law1, (ii) the interplay between the UK judiciary’s 
interpretive mandate under section 3 of the HRA and its power to issue a declaration 
of incompatibility pursuant to section 42, and (iii) the ‘dialogic’ nature of the HRA 
that facilitates a constitutional conversation between Parliament and the judiciary.3 
Notwithstanding the plethora of academic literature on the HRA, there has been little 
discussion on the types of interpretive arguments the House of Lords and the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom (hereinafter termed collectively as the Court) deploy in 
reaching a particular legal result under the HRA. This lacuna in the literature is 
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especially surprising, since the most common and central task of the courts under the 
HRA is to always construct, in each case, the constitutional arguments in favour of, or 
against, a particular result by appealing to a range of interpretive methods available 
and appropriate under the law. This article will thus seek to fill the gap in the 
literature by exploring how the Court has generally appealed to four constitutional 
‘modalities’ 4  when interpreting the HRA: (i) textual arguments, (ii) historical 
arguments, (iii) precedential arguments, and (iv) consequentialist arguments. 
Textual arguments are constitutional arguments that focus on the statutory language 
of the HRA; such interpretive arguments examine the meaning of the statutory text, as 
situated within the linguistic practice of the community, alongside the accepted 
canons of statutory interpretation. Historical arguments 5  appeal to the original 
understandings of the framers of the HRA when they were seeking to incorporate the 
European Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as the Convention) 
within domestic law. Arguments from precedent seek to construct from prior case-
law, for example decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) or House 
of Lords, persuasive authority for how the current dispute should be resolved, by 
arguing how those past decisions and the propositions of law advanced therein are on 
point or analogous to the present one. Finally, consequentialist arguments seek to 
reach legal answers from a calculus of costs and benefits, when the facts are taken 
into account.6 They usually involve the application of a ‘balancing’ test that seeks to 
weigh the value of competing rights and interests. Furthermore, this consequentialist 
‘balancing’ test also takes into the institutional disadvantages of the judicial forum 
and the conditions of epistemic uncertainty that judges face during adjudication, and 
this explains the role of judicial deference when courts engage in such 
consequentialist argumentation. However, one must note at the outset that there is no 
formal hierarchy of constitutional arguments that the Court has deployed; different 
types of interpretive arguments are more appropriate and persuasive when different 
clauses of the HRA are operative. 
The classification of constitutional argumentation in general is not new. Professor 
Phillip Bobbitt in a seminal book was the first to devise a typography of constitutional 
arguments. With regard to the US constitution, he describes six such forms that 
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constitute the justificatory matrix of American constitutional law: (i) the historical 
(relying on the intentions of the framers and the ratifiers of the constitution); (ii) 
textual (looking to the meaning of the word of the constitution alone as understood by 
the reasonable person); (iii) structural (inferring rules from the relationships that the 
constitution mandates among the structures it sets up); (iv) doctrinal (applying rules 
generated by precedent); (iv) ethical (deriving rules from those moral 
commitments/ethos that are reflected in the constitution); and (v) prudential (seeking 
to balance the costs and benefits of a particular rule).7 
Understandably, my readers may ask whether this constitutional method as devised by 
an American vis-à-vis the US constitution is applicable to the United Kingdom. Put it 
another way, can a British Bill of Rights be read in the same way as an American 
constitutional instrument, with a history of over two centuries, which has been 
interpreted almost without the influence of any Convention law? This is an important 
methodological objection to which I will now address. 
First, this objection may have conflated the issue of constitutional substance with 
its form. The above methodological objection is essentially a concern over the 
substance of constitutional law, that is, different countries with different histories may 
draft different texts to address different problems, such that a constitutional decision 
reached by a national court in one case may not be applicable if the same issue arises 
in a different jurisdiction. But Bobbitt was not providing a constitutional theory to 
prescribe the substance of constitutional law in America or in any other jurisdiction. 
Instead, he had developed a set of constitutional grammar for constitutional discourse. 
These forms of arguments do not prescribe the substantive result that any judge would 
reach, any more than the rules of grammar would dictate the substance of what we 
say. In other words, these forms of constitutional argumentation are the tools of the 
judicial trade; they do not, in themselves, determine what the judges build with them. 
Therefore, any concern that American law is untethered to ECHR jurisprudence is 
irrelevant to the issue that I am examining herein, which is the form of constitutional 
argumentation and not the substance of constitutional decisions. 
Secondly, my readers may respond by querying whether the forms of constitutional 
grammar applicable in the United States differ from that used in the United Kingdom. 
Indeed, they are not wholly the same; hence my taxonomy differs in part from that of 
Bobbitt’s. The consequentialist argument deployed by the Court is wider than the 
prudential ‘cost-benefit analysis’ argument applied in the United States. Furthermore, 
structural and ethical arguments have not been deployed by the Court vis-à-vis HRA 
adjudication. This is not to say that they will never be, as the Court can adopt such 
forms of argumentation in future cases. These four categories of mine are not meantto 
be exhaustive and complete for all times; they merely reflect the current state of 
Britain’s development. Indeed, the judicial use of ethical arguments as championed by 
common law constitutionalists 8  may emerge in the future vis-à-vis the HRA 
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adjudication. 
Therefore, the normative attraction of Bobbitt’s theory is that its general applicability 
is not strictly confined to the unique state of American constitutional review; so long 
as any of these forms of argumentation are practised by the Court in the United 
Kingdom, and accepted so by its community, they are legitimate forms of authority in 
Britain too. In other words, the constitutional forms of argumentation are legitimate 
tools of interpretation precisely because we can locate them within Britain’s 
constitutional discourse. 
Therefore, the thrust of this project will be to illustrate how the actual constitutional 
practice of the Court currently reflects this four-fold ‘multi-valenced’9 interpretive 
model of interpretation. In so doing, I shall also endeavour to show how this 
pluralistic interpretive model is normatively attractive as a constitutional theory as it 
‘fits’ the central features of Britain’s constitutional practice and is also superior to the 
alternatives.10 
Part 1 of this paper begins by elaborating upon and fleshing out the abovementioned 
types of constitutional arguments, and illustrating how the Law Lords have deployed 
these arguments when adjudicating over HRA claims. Naturally, in the limited space 
one has, I have only chosen to discuss the HRA cases of the Court that are most 
illustrative of my central arguments; but it is my considered view that the Court has 
deployed one or more of the modalities discussed in every HRA case decided. Part 2 
of the paper continues by defending the normative value associated with this ‘multi-
valenced’ interpretive model. To do so, I shall concede, at the outset, that this model 
can never provide a single correct answer in every instance. But neither can any 
constitutional theory rely upon any one particular unitary interpretive methodology 
(whether that exclusive source may be the text, history, or precedents of the HRA) to 
resolve a concrete dispute. After all, even within each modality or type of 
constitutional argument, there may still be ‘intra-modal’11 conflicts, such that there 
can still be reasonable disagreements as to what the correct answer within that 
modality is. My more modest aim, in Part 2, is to illustrate how the various types of 
constitutional arguments are substantially interdependent and interrelated, such that 
they often dovetail with one another to reach a reasonably coherent and defensible 
legal result. 
2. PART 1: THE TAXONOMY 
(a) Textual Arguments 
Textual arguments are constitutional arguments that focus on the statutory language 
of the HRA. Specifically, one may observe both internal and external constraints on 
the interpretation of text. Internal constraints on text are imposed by the reciprocal 
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interplay between a word and the sentence it is found within.12 Nevertheless, the 
meaning of a sentence is not entirely determined by the meanings of its parts and their 
syntactical combination in that sentence.13 In many instances, the ‘literal’ meaning of 
a sentence only has application and relevance relative to a set of external, contextual 
assumptions, common to the interpretive community, which cannot be fully realized 
by the semantic structure of the said sentence.14 
The best example where the House of Lords has deployed textual arguments in HRA 
adjudication would be R v. Lambert. 15  In that case, the Law Lords had to 
determine, inter alia, whether the HRA could apply retrospectively to appeals against 
convictions that were secured in trials that predated the coming into effect of the 
HRA. The key sections on retrospectivity under the HRA are laid out in section 22(4) 
read against section 7(1)(b). Specifically, section 7(1)(b) provides that a person who 
claims that a public authority has acted in an unlawful way may rely on the 
Convention right concerned in any legal proceedings, but according to section 22(4), 
section 7(1)(b) only ‘applies to proceedings brought by or at the instigation of a 
public authority whenever the act in question took place; but otherwise that 
subsection does not apply to an act taking place before the coming into force of that 
section.’ 
According to the majority in Lambert, an appeal was not a proceeding within the 
scope of section 22(4) read with section 7(1)(b). This was because, pursuant to section 
7(6) of the HRA, the term ‘legal proceedings’ in section 7(1)(b) includes: (i) 
proceedings brought by or at the instigation of a public authority and (ii) an appeal 
against the decision of a court. Since section 22(4) of the HRA refers only to 
proceedings, and not legal proceedings, and does not mention appeals, appeals 
therefore would not be covered by the retrospectivity statutory clause. 
As opined by Lord Clyde: 
[I]n terms of section 22(4) the only acts contravening the Convention prior 
to 2 October 2000 which can be considered are acts on which reliance may 
be placed in terms of section 7(1)(b). Section 22(4) states expressly that 
‘otherwise that subsection does not apply to an act taking place before the 
coming into force of that section’. That subsection applies to ‘legal 
proceedings’ as defined in section 7(6), that is, both ‘proceedings brought 
by or at the instigation of a public authority’ and an appeal. But the 
provision admitting reliance on earlier acts in section 22(4) is limited to 
‘proceedings brought by or at the instigation of a public authority’. The 
use of the same language as was used in section 7(6) is significant. In my 
view the intention is that section 22(4) should not extend to the other kind 
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of ‘legal proceedings’ mentioned in section 7(6), namely an appeal.16 
This textual construction of section 22(4) was also echoed by the other Law Lords in 
the Lambert majority.17 Therefore, where the retrospectivity clause refers, in identical 
words to the words found in section 7(6)(a), that is, ‘proceedings brought by or at the 
instigation of a public authority’, the retrospective operation permitted by section 
22(4) would therefore not apply to an appeal against a judicial decision. 
Textual arguments were equally deployed by Lord Rodger in R (Al-Skeini & 
others) v. Secretary of State for Defence.18 On the facts, the House of Lords had to 
decide whether the HRA applied to six Iraqi civilians who had been killed by or in the 
course of action taken by British soldiers in Iraq.19 Specifically, Lord Rodger wrote 
the leading judgment on whether the HRA applied to acts committed outside the 
territory of the United Kingdom. Section 6(1) of the HRA provides that it is unlawful 
for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right. 
Furthermore, section 7(1) of the HRA states that a person who claims that public 
authority has acted unlawfully may bring proceedings against a public authority or 
rely on the Convention rights in any legal proceedings, but only if he is a victim of 
that unlawful act. Nevertheless, the Secretary of State had sought to argue that 
sections 6 and 7 should be interpreted to exclude acts performed, or producing effects, 
outside the United Kingdom.20 Lord Rodger, however, in affirming that the central 
purpose of the HRA was to provide a remedial structure in domestic law for 
Convention rights, rejected the Secretary of State’s argument and observed as 
follows: 
I am unable to accept that submission. It involves reading into sections 6 
and 7 a qualification which the words do not contain and which runs 
counter to the central purpose of the Act. That would be to offend against 
the most elementary canons of statutory construction which indicate that, 
in case of doubt, the Act should be read so as to promote, not so as to 
defeat or impair, its central purpose.21 
(b) Historical Arguments 
Historical arguments are deployed when the Law Lords seek to identify the meaning 
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of the statutory language in the HRA by discerning what the framers would have 
originally understood the provisions to mean when they were enacting the text as law. 
Such original understandings could be derived from legislative history such as 
the White Paper on the Human Rights Bill and/or records of the parliamentary 
statements made during the passage of the HRA. 
An excellent illustration of how historical arguments were deployed would be Lord 
Steyn’s judgment in R v. A22, where the House of Lords had to consider, inter alia, 
whether the section 3 interpretive obligation under the HRA could be used to read 
into a rape-shield legislation an implied provision that evidence which was required to 
ensure a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention would not be treated as 
inadmissible. While Lord Steyn and counsel on both sides conceded that on ordinary 
methods of statutory interpretation, the impugned penal provision could not 
reasonably bear such a reading23, his Lordship opined that Parliament, when passing 
the HRA, had intended the section 3 interpretative obligation to apply differently and 
more radically: 
The White Paper made clear that the obligation goes far beyond the rule 
which enabled the courts to take the Convention into account in resolving 
any ambiguity in a legislative provision: see ‘Rights Brought Home: The 
Human Rights Bill’ (1997) (Cm 3782), para 2.7. The draftsman of the Act 
had before him the slightly weaker model in section 6 of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 but preferred stronger language. Parliament 
specifically rejected the legislative model of requiring a reasonable 
interpretation. Section 3 places a duty on the court to strive to find a 
possible interpretation compatible with Convention rights. Under ordinary 
methods of interpretation a court may depart from the language of the 
statute to avoid absurd consequences: section 3 goes much 
further…section 3 is more radical in its effect…. In the progress of the Bill 
through Parliament the Lord Chancellor observed that ‘in 99% of the cases 
that will arise, there will be no need for judicial declarations of 
incompatibility’ and the Home Secretary said ‘We expect that, in almost 
all cases, the courts will be able to interpret the legislation compatibility 
with the Convention’: Hansard (HL Debates), 5 February 1998, col 840 
(3rd Reading) and Hansard (HC Debates), 16 February 1998, col 778 (2nd 
Reading)…In accordance with the will of Parliament as reflected in 
section 3 it will sometimes be necessary to adopt an interpretation which 
linguistically may appear strained.24 
Another good illustration of how historical arguments were harnessed in the context 
of the HRA adjudication would be Lord Rodger’s dissenting opinion in the Attorney 
General’s Reference (No 2 of 2001)25. In that case, the majority on the House of 
Lords held that a stay of criminal proceedings would be allowed where the accused 
																																								 																				
22 [2002] 1 AC 45. 
23 Ibid [43]. 
24 Ibid [44]. 
25 [2004] 2 AC 72 (HL). 
had not been brought to trial within a reasonable time and a fair hearing was no longer 
possible or it was, for any compelling reason, unfair to now try the defendant. 
Specifically, Lord Bingham, who wrote the leading judgment for the majority, held 
that section 6 of the HRA only authorized the court to entertain proceedings against a 
defendant ‘if to do so is compatible with the defendant’s Convention rights and so 
lawful but not if to do so is incompatible with the defendant’s Convention rights and 
so unlawful.’26 
In disagreement, Lord Rodger, in turn, argued that section 6 had no bearing on how 
courts could fashion a just and appropriate remedy to address a breach of a 
Convention right and it merely existed to ‘act as the key to unlock these 
remedies.’ 27  In support of this view, his Lordship cited the UK government’s 
statements in the White Paper, Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill28: 
A public authority which is found to have acted unlawfully by failing to 
comply with the Convention will not be exposed to criminal penalties. But 
the court or tribunal will be able to grant the injured person any remedy 
which is within its normal powers to grant and which it considers 
appropriate and just in the circumstances. What remedy is appropriate will 
of course depend both on the facts of the case and on a proper balance 
between the rights of the individual and the public interest. In some cases, 
the right course may be for the decision of the public authority in the 
particular case to be quashed.29 
Therefore, according to Lord Rodger, the government, when commending the Human 
Rights Bill to Parliament, clearly did not intend for every unlawful act of a public 
authority, that was incompatible with the Convention, to be always quashed. Instead, 
the Bill was not intended to ‘prescribe any specific remedy for a violation… and 
would leave it to the courts to choose the appropriate remedy in the circumstances.’30 
(c)  Precedential Arguments 
Argumentation from precedent is a core structural feature of adjudication in the UK 
and across all common law systems. The doctrine of precedent is generally justified 
on the basis that it enhances the predictability in the law so far as the citizenry can 
expect courts to follow their prior case-law; and this in turn promotes fairness by 
ensuring that similarly situated litigants are treated equally before the 
law.31 Furthermore, the doctrine of stare decisis facilitates decisional efficiency32; 
where judges express epistemic humility to the wisdom to their predecessors, they are 
freed from reconsidering every issue before the court. As observed by the US 
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Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo, 
the labour of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if 
every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay 
one’s own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by 
others who had gone before him.33 
According to section 2 of the HRA, the UK judiciary must ‘take into account’ the 
case-law of the ECHR. As a matter of practice, the Court would follow any ‘clear and 
constant jurisprudence’34 of the ECHR, and has declined to follow Strasbourg when it 
perceives that the ECHR has not sufficiently appreciated and accommodated 
particular aspects of the UK domestic process.35 It is however outside the scope of 
this paper to fully explore whether or when the ‘mirror principle’36, that is, the 
domestic courts’ interpretation of the HRA should seek to mirror the corresponding 
Convention rights, as interpreted by the ECHR, should apply in the United Kingdom; 
my purpose herein is to merely illustrate how the Court has deployed precedential 
arguments to resolve HRA disputes. 
Arguments from precedents are most commonly deployed when the Court is seeking 
to overrule its own decisions. In Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF37, 
the House of Lords had to consider whether the right to a fair trial as protected under 
Article 6 of the Convention would be violated if the case made against a person in a 
control-order proceeding was based solely or to a decisive degree on closed materials 
that were not disclosed to him. Previously, a majority of the House of Lords 
in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB38 had accepted that Article 6 did 
not impose such a per se rule against the use of such closed materials, and it would be 
up to the trial judge to decide whether the requirements of fair trial were met in the 
circumstances of any particular control-order proceeding. Nevertheless, since MB, the 
Grand Chamber of the ECHR in A v. United Kingdom39 had ruled emphatically that 
the requirements of fair trial could never be satisfied in such circumstances, regardless 
of how cogent the case based on the closed materials might be. As such, Lord 
Phillips, who wrote the leading judgment in AF opined as follows: ‘That is why the 
clear terms of the judgment in A v. United Kingdom resolve the issue raised in these 
appeals.’40 Lord Rodger echoed the same views, but with more rhetorical flourish: 
Even though we are dealing with rights under a United Kingdom statute, in 
reality, we have no choice: Argentoratum locutum iudicium finitum – 
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Strasbourg has spoken, the case is closed.41 
More commonly, however, the Court would not be faced with an ECHR precedent 
that is directly on point with the issues before it. When confronted with an unsettled 
question, the task before the Court is to reason analogically from past precedents by 
identifying ways in which these decisions are ‘similar to or different from each other 
and the question’42 before it, and developing a legal principle that captures the 
similarities and differences that are deemed important. 
Such analogical reasoning from precedents was displayed by the House of Lords in R 
(Purdy) v. Director of Public Prosecutions43. In that case, the Court unanimously held 
that the DPP had violated the applicant’s Convention right, under Article 8, to respect 
for her private life, so far as he had refused to disclose factors he would take into 
account in deciding whether to prosecute her husband for complicity in suicide if he 
had assisted her death in a foreign country where assisted suicide was legal. It is 
noteworthy that the ECHR had decided in Pretty v. United Kingdom44 that Britain’s 
ban on assisted suicide was a proportionate limitation on the Article 8 right; but, 
interestingly, both Baroness Hale and Lord Brown drew from the ECHR’s arguments 
in Pretty in support of their conclusions. For Baroness Hale, she noted that the ECHR 
upheld the ban on the basis it provides ‘for a system of enforcement and adjudication 
which allows due regard to be given in each particular case to the public 
interest;45 and since the justification of such a ban depended upon the flexibility of its 
operation, her Lordship opined that the ban could not be in accordance with law under 
Article 8(2) unless ‘there is greater clarity about the factors which the Director of 
Public Prosecutions and his subordinates will take into account in making their 
decisions.’46 Similarly, Lord Brown argued that, implicit in the ECHR reasoning 
in Pretty, a prosecution in certain circumstances would actually be inappropriate; and 
therefore, a blanket ban, without more, would not be in accordance with law unless 
the official policy for or against prosecution was promulgated.47 
In the same vein, Lord Kerr, in his dissenting opinion in Ambrose v. Harris48, 
attempted to reason analogically from prior ECHR precedents. On the facts, the 
majority held that the Grand Chamber of the ECHR decision in Salduz v. 
Turkey49 had not expressly mandated that an accused be given the right of access to a 
lawyer, prior to police questioning, before he or she was taken into police custody. In 
disagreement, Lord Kerr argued that a suspect could be equally vulnerable at any 
juncture when evidence that was potentially inculpatory was being obtained, and the 
focus of the ECHR’s concern in Salduz was on the circumstances in which the 
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questionings could produce self-incriminating statements. 50  Therefore, for Lord 
Kerr, Salduz would require the State to inform a suspect of his or her right to legal 
representation, even if he or she was not in police custody, as long as those questions 
put to him or her were capable of producing inculpatory evidence.51 
In essence, analogical reasoning is, in itself, a form of precedential argument, so far as 
judges are seeking to construct legal rules that conform to a body of existing decisions 
and reconcile new developments with past ones. As observed by Professor Richard 
Fallon, prior judicial decisions form ‘a patchwork into which a current problem must 
be fitted through’52 a combination of analytical and analogical reasoning. 
(d) Consequentialist Arguments 
Consequentialist arguments are legal arguments deployed by the Court that take into 
account the costs and benefits of a specific rule, and also the political and practical 
consequences of ruling in any particular way. In other words, consequentialist 
argumentation is more than just a ‘law and economics’ approach to judicial balancing; 
it also takes into account the institutional disadvantages of the judicial forum and the 
conditions of epistemic uncertainty that judges face during deliberation, and this 
underscores the role for judicial deference in constitutional adjudication. The 
proportionality analysis adopted by the UK judiciary and many other common law 
courts when they review the necessity of legislative limitations on rights is one such 
consequentialist interpretive device. A classic formulation of what the Court asks 
when it applies the proportionality doctrine is as follows: 
Whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify 
limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative 
objective are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the 
right or freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.53 
This interpretive device, at one level, involves a form of cost-benefit analysis as 
judges have to weigh the importance of various statutory goals against the severity of 
any rights-derogations. In so doing, judges often acknowledge that they may need 
‘additional background information tending to show, for instance, the likely practical 
impact of the statutory measure’54 under challenge. 
A good illustration of this type of consequentialist argument at play would be the 
Supreme Court’s decision in R (F & Thompson) v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department.55 In that case, the Court had to consider whether the statutory imposition 
on all sexual offenders, who were sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment or more, a 
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life-long requirement, without the right of review, to notify the police of where they 
were living and their travel plans, violated the offenders’ Convention right to respect 
for their private lives. The Court eventually ruled that this legislative measure was too 
disproportionate as the imposition of the notification requirement was for life and 
without review, and the government had advanced no evidence before the courts to 
demonstrate that it was impossible to identify some sexual offenders who posed no 
significant risk of re-offending; the fact that many other countries like Canada, 
France, Ireland, and the United States all provided for such review further suggested 
that such a review exercise was not impracticable.56 
But the consequentialist argument is also more than just a cost-benefit analysis. In 
applying the proportionality analysis, however, scholars have observed that courts 
face two general limitations when they deploy such consequentialist arguments. First, 
it is recognized that, vis-à-vis the legislature, the judiciary lacks democratic 
legitimacy.57 Since judges are less accountable to the electorate, the judicial forum 
may not be the most appropriate institution to resolve societal disputes concerning the 
contested application of competing rights. Second, on certain issues concerning 
resource allocation, fiscal planning, and national security, it is generally recognized 
that the political branches of government have more information, experience, and 
skills to assess the consequences of particular decisions and resolve such questions 
correctly,58 and therefore the judiciary may be institutionally less competent to decide 
whether the legislative/administrative limitations are constitutionally reasonable or 
right. These twin concerns about the court’s intrinsic limitations have led to a demand 
for judicial deference in public law where courts are encouraged to assign weight to 
the primary determinations of the political branches and exercise restraint when they 
review legislative/administrative decisions.59 
While Professor Trevor Allan does not reject the idea of judicial deference per se and 
believes that courts may take into account ‘questions of constitutional propriety and 
judicial restraint [that] are internal to the ordinary judicial process’60, he refutes Dr 
Aileen Kavanagh’s suggestion that deference may also be defended on prudential 
grounds where courts may consider whether 
a particular judicial decision would produce a backlash in society; whether 
society is ready for the legal change; whether it might be counterproductive to 
introduce it at this particular time; and whether the elected branches of 
government would than move to curtail the powers of the courts as a result.61 
According to him, such prudential concerns have no place in any judicial 
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determination of rights as judicial moves to assuage a hostile legislature is a form of 
subterfuge, which is inconsistent with the fundamental judicial duty to impartially 
administer justice in each case according to law.62 
Nevertheless, this view is premised on an assumption that judges are infallible in their 
moral deliberations; whenever judges unwillingly submit to legislative whims, they 
must be consciously subverting the rule of law. But if we take the view that judges are 
capable of committing moral blunders, and that they are conscious of their own 
fallibilities, we may agree that judges, when deciding upon highly contested moral 
dilemmas, should take into account any strongly held views of the legislature (or the 
electorate), as it is equally plausible that in the long run these legislative views may 
prove to be the normatively correct ones. 
Consequentialist arguments that reflect the Court’s unease with its lack of democratic 
credentials were most evidently displayed in the House of Lords decision in R 
(Pretty) v. Director of Public Prosecutions.63 On the facts, the claimant, a physically 
incapacitated, terminally ill person, argued that DPP’s refusal to give an undertaking 
not to prosecute her husband for assisting her suicide overseas was a violation of her 
right to life and privacy. The House of Lords unanimously rejected her claim and, in 
particular, Lord Hope opined as follows: 
In the present uncertain climate of public opinion, where there is no consensus 
in favour of assisted suicide and there are powerful religious and ethical 
arguments to the contrary, any change in the law which would make assisted 
suicide generally acceptable is best seen as a matter for Parliament.64 
Such acknowledgement that adjudication must at times be permeable to public 
opinion certainly poses a challenge to traditional views that judges merely apply 
determinate rules impartially.65 Nevertheless, one must note that while courts are 
granted a constitutional mandate to interpret rights, and they should discharge this 
democratic duty faithfully, there may be exceptional cases in which a particular law 
reform may create widespread upheaval in society that courts, in view of inherent 
epistemic moral uncertainty associated with judicial law-making, may prefer to secure 
some consensus or support from the elected branches of government before they so 
act. This should not be viewed as a form of judicial abdication as Professor Jeffrey 
Jowell has argued,66 but instead as a candid recognition that judges, like legislators, 
are fallible at moral reasoning, and they may prefer not to exclude the ordinary 
political process from deliberating on important constitutional issues. Therefore, to 
this extent, the prudential concerns dovetail with the argument for judicial deference 
on the ground of the legislature’s relative democratic legitimacy in resolving 
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contested applications of competing rights/interests.67 
Equally, the Court has deployed consequentialist arguments when it recognized the 
institutional disadvantages associated with its office when assessing national security 
claims. National security issues present the judiciary with an acute dilemma as, in 
carrying out their reviewing role, judges usually do not have all the secret information 
available to the primary decision makers and the stakes of some of these decisions are 
often very high.68 Deference is thus a rational, consequentialist response to this 
epistemic uncertainty. 
Even as the House of Lords found against the government in A v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department69, Baroness Hale had acknowledged as follows: 
Assessing the strength of a general threat to the life of the nation is, or should 
be, within the expertise of the government and its advisers… It would be very 
surprising if the courts were better able to make that sort of judgment than the 
government.70 
It is thus unsurprising that the House of Lords in R (Gillan) v. Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner71 upheld the police’s statutory right to stop and search persons for 
articles connected to terrorism, even in the absence of reasonable suspicion. As Lord 
Scott observed, assessing whether the police should have such stop-and-search 
powers to combat terrorism require some information of the ‘intelligence material on 
which the police and the Home Secretary relied when making their own assessment of 
that threat and of what should be done in response to it’72, but the Court was not privy 
to such information and inevitably had to defer to the government’s determination.73 
3. PART 2: DEFENDING ‘MULTI-VALENCED’ CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 
As argued above, this ‘multi-valenced’ model of constitutional interpretation allows 
the Court to reason through different sources of legal arguments that draw from the 
text of the HRA, the history behind its enactment, the precedents built upon it, and the 
consequences or practical constraints of adopting competing interpretive positions. 
These different strands or modalities of constitutional argumentation reasoning may 
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inevitably open this mode of legal reasoning to charges that it is inherently 
indeterminate and open to judicial manipulation, and it is to this criticism that I now 
turn. After all, different modalities may lead the Court to reach competing results, and 
judges will have an unconstrained choice to select the outcome they prefer. Such 
critics may prefer then for judges to privilege one or two types of constitutional 
arguments, for example textual or historical arguments, such that if these arguments 
point to a certain solution, its conclusion should strictly control the issue at hand. 
At the outset, I will first concede that the multi-sourced interpretive approach may, in 
some cases, lead to divergent outcomes depending on the ‘modality’ of constitutional 
argumentation that the judges deem determinative. In Pinnock v. Manchester City 
Council74, the Supreme Court eventually subordinated consequentialist arguments 
against the judicial review of individual applications for housing by local authorities 
tasked with the unenviable duty of distributing scarce resources efficiently to the 
precedential argument following the ECHR’s insistence 75  that Article 8 of the 
Convention (the right to respect for one’s private and family life) required a tenant to 
have an opportunity to have the courts determine whether his or her eviction is 
proportionate. 
In the same vein, in Tariq v. Home Office76, the majority on the Supreme Court was 
persuaded by consequentialist arguments in favour of excluding the claimant, a 
former immigration officer, from certain aspects of his employment tribunal 
proceedings on grounds of national security concerns, and held that this ‘closed 
procedure’ was not a violation of his Convention-protected right to a fair trial. As 
opined by Lord Hope: 
In this case the individual is not faced with criminal proceedings against him 
or with severe restrictions on personal liberty. This is a civil claim and the 
question is whether Mr Tariq is entitled to damages… But the Home Office 
says that it cannot defend the claim in open proceedings as, for 
understandable reasons, it cannot reveal how security vetting was done in his 
case. That conclusion is unavoidable, given the nature of the work Mr Tariq 
was employed to do.77 
On the other hand, Lord Kerr, in his dissenting opinion, preferred to emphasize the 
historical arguments for providing the claimant with access to the withheld material, 
as the ‘right to know and effectively challenge the opposing case has long been 
recognized by the common law as a fundamental feature of the judicial process.’78 
While different types of constitutional argument may lead to divergent constitutional 
outcomes in some cases, one must note that any judicial reliance on a singular 
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interpretive methodology will not solve this problem. 
Texualists may appeal to the statutory language of the HRA, for the authority of the 
text rests on the normative appeal of a formal, legally adopted law.79 But the HRA, 
like most human rights instruments, enshrines abstract, open-textured rights that are 
often open to a multitude of interpretations in specific contexts, and textualism alone 
cannot resolve this interpretive conundrum. Originalists may prize historical 
arguments in constitutional adjudication such that judicial review can become more 
democratic by virtue of their connection to the past judgments of the HRA framers; 
and consequently, judicial discretion can also be fettered by this turn to history.80 Yet, 
any attempts to shackle the HRA to the framers’ original specific application of the 
text at the time of enactment may indeed be inconsistent with Parliament’s express 
intent of allowing the UK judges to ‘contribute to this dynamic and evolving 
interpretation of the Convention’81 that reflects ‘changing social attitudes and changes 
in the circumstances of society.’82 So far as the HRA was meant to incorporate the 
Convention within domestic law, the precedents of the ECHR will provide immense 
insights to the UK courts. But the British judges can never be legally bound by these 
precedential arguments, for that would fly in the face of the express statutory 
language of the HRA that merely mandates them to ‘take into account’83 these 
European judgments. Consequentialist arguments are very helpful when courts are 
crafting doctrinal rules to implement various human rights norms. One such example 
is the proportionality doctrine, a ubiquitous interpretive device where judges have to 
weigh the institutional competence of the courts to intervene in polycentric issues 
against the severity of any rights-derogations, and adopt a context-specific variable 
intensity of review over the legislative actions.84 But if judges were to consider 
consequentialist arguments alone, without more, they may be perceived to be 
engaging in lawless judging and usurping the legislative prerogatives on policy-
making.85 Ultimately, as we observe above, no singular interpretive argument can be 
relied upon exclusively to resolve all HRA disputes. 
Furthermore, critics that consider ‘multi-valenced’ interpretation indeterminate and 
uncertain because of the presence of ‘cross-modal’ conflicts86 may often neglect the 
fact that ‘intra-modal’ conflicts87 can also take place such that, even within the same 
interpretive medium, judges may have different views on the right outcome. 
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In R v. Lambert88, as discussed earlier, the majority on the House of Lords applied 
textual arguments in reading section 22(4) against section 7(1)(b), and concluded that 
the HRA could not apply retrospectively to appeals against convictions that were 
secured in trials that predated the coming into effect of the HRA. Yet, it is noteworthy 
that Lord Steyn, in dissent, also applied textual arguments but only to reach the 
opposite conclusion.89 According to his Lordship, the determinative HRA provision in 
question was section 6(1), which provides that it is unlawful for a public authority, 
which includes the House of Lords, to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right. Since the appeal was heard before the House of Lords after the 
HRA had come into effect, Lord Steyn argued that section 6 would bind the conduct 
of the Law Lords. As he observed: 
There is also nothing in section 7 which expressly or by necessary implication 
qualifies the ordinary and plain effect of section 6(1)… I agree with Clayton 
& Tomlinson… that ‘the effect of Section 22(4) is obscure’… The language 
of the statute points in one direction only: the House may not act unlawfully 
by upholding a conviction which was obtained in breach of a Convention 
right. It will be observed that this interpretation reads nothing into section 
6(1)… it simply gives effect to the obvious meaning of plain words.90 
In the same vein, in R (Wellington) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department91, 
the House of Lords were divided on whether, for the purposes of Article 3 of the 
Convention, the test to determine what constituted ‘inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment’ was the same when one was considering the likely fate that an 
individual, whose extradition was being sought, would face in the requesting country 
as when one was considering what constituted inhuman treatment in a purely 
domestic context. But one must note that both the majority and the dissent applied 
precedential arguments for their conclusions. The majority92 preferred a ‘relativist’ 
approach to what constituted inhuman treatment as this seemed to be sanctioned by 
Strasbourg in Soering v. United Kingdom.93 The minority94 argued for an ‘absolutist’ 
approach as that seemed to them to be the legal position after Chahal v. United 
Kingdom.95 
Similarly, in R (Aguilar Quila) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department96, a 
majority of the Supreme Court invalidated an immigration rule that required both the 
UK-based sponsor and his or her overseas-based spouse to be over the age of 
																																								 																				
88 [2002] 2 AC 545. 
89 For a critique of Lord Steyn’s arguments, see D Beyleveld, R Kirkham and D Townend ‘Which 
Presumption? A Critique of the House of Lords’ Reasoning on Retrospectivity and the Human Rights Act’ 
(2002) LS 185, 199–200. 
90 Lambert (n 15) [28]. 
91 [2009] 1 AC 335. 
92 Ibid [30] (Lord Hoffmann); [50]–[51] (Baroness Hale); [57]–[58] (Lord Carswell). 
93 (1989) 11 EHRR 439. 
94 R (Wellington) (n 91) [2009] 1 AC 335, [85] (Lord Brown); [40] (Lord Scott). 
95 (1997) 23 EHRR 413. 
96 [2012] 1 AC 621. 
21,97 before the former could sponsor the latter’s resettlement in the United Kingdom. 
It was noteworthy that both the majority and the dissent applied consequentialist 
arguments in determining whether this legislative measure was a proportionate 
limitation on the applicant’s right to marry. For the majority, the measure was 
disproportionate as this rule would interfere with more entirely voluntary marriages 
than it would deter or delay forced marriages, the primary legislative goal.98 Lord 
Brown, in dissent, argued that the majority’s proportionality analysis was 
misconceived as the comparison between the enormity of suffering within forced 
marriages and the disruption to innocent couples who had to wait up to three years 
before they could live together in the United Kingdom was one essentially for elected 
politicians and not judges to make.99 
In the foregoing analysis, I have sought to illustrate that ‘intra-modal’ conflicts can be 
as equally perplexing as ‘cross-modal’ ones. Courts are routinely faced with 
conflicting precedents, contrasting consequentialist considerations, and/or clashing 
textual arguments. Therefore, any reliance on a fixed, singular modality will not make 
the interpretive task of the courts any easier or less discretionary. 
Finally, the use of this ‘multi-valenced’ approach may indeed help resolve ‘intra-
modal’ conflicts within a particular medium. For example, where there is contrasting 
textual arguments, judges may turn to precedential and/or consequentialist arguments 
to see whether the other arguments can break the impasse by pointing in any 
particular direction that help resolve the interpretive conundrum. In Wilson v. First 
County Trust Ltd 100 , the House of Lords had to decide, inter alia, whether a 
contractual agreement governed by the Consumer Credit Act, which had been entered 
into before the implementation of the HRA, could none the less be subjected to the 
provisions of the HRA. One may note that the Law Lords therein were confronted 
with competing textual arguments at play. On one hand, the remedial interpretive 
obligation of section 3 of the HRA applies to primary and secondary legislation 
‘whenever enacted’; but on the other hand, there exists an accepted canon of statutory 
construction which provides that legislation is presumed not to operate 
retrospectively.101 In the end, the Law Lords turned to consequentialist arguments to 
resolve this textual gridlock. As opined by Lord Nicholls who wrote the leading 
judgment: 
Considerable difficulties, however, might arise if the new interpretation of 
legislation, consequent on an application of s3, were always to apply to pre- 
[Human Rights] Act events. It would mean that parties’ rights under existing 
legislation in respect of a transaction completed before the Act came into 
force could be changed overnight, to the benefit or one party and the prejudice 
of the other. This change, moreover, would operate capriciously, with the 
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outcome depending on whether the parties’ rights were determined by a court 
before or after 2 October 2000…. [D]ifferent considerations apply to post-Act 
criminal trials in respect of pre-Act happenings. The prosecution does not 
have an accrued or vested right in any relevant sense.102 
In the same vein, where the text of the HRA is silent on how a constitutional issue 
should be resolved, precedential and consequentialist arguments may dovetail with 
each other and point in the same interpretive direction. In M v. Secretary of State for 
Work and Pension103, a parent, who lived with her same-sex partner, challenged her 
child support contribution as it was greater than it would have been if she were in a 
heterosexual relationship, but a majority of the House of Lords refused to deem the 
impugned statutory measure, inter alia, a violation of her right to respect for family 
life. First, the majority noted that the ECHR had not recognized the relationship 
between same-sex couples as constituting family life within the Convention;104 and 
secondly, the discriminatory measure had already been removed by the Civil 
Partnerships Act, and the majority was thus reluctant to ‘stigmatise as unjustifiably 
discriminatory a regime which, given the size of the overall task and the need to 
recruit the support of the public, could scarcely have been reformed sooner.’105 
Therein, arguments from precedent dovetailed with the consequentialist argument for 
judicial deference on the basis of Parliament’s comparative democratic legitimacy in 
resolving contested application of rights. 
4. CONCLUSION 
As observed above, this four-fold ‘multi-valenced’ constitutionalism is characteristic 
of the Court’s current interpretive approach during HRA adjudication. The judicial 
focus on the different modalties of text, history, precedents, and consequences may 
shift according to the constitutional issue at hand, and new modalities may emerge 
over time; but in tandem, they provide an overarching interpretive framework for the 
Court to arrive at a reasoned legal result. 
Certainly, the multiplicity of legal argumentations may provide for reasonable 
disagreements within this legal discourse. But as Professor Phillip Bobbitt has argued, 
recourse to a singular interpretive source is not a viable alternative: 
A single modality cannot be both comprehensive and determinate. If it is 
determinate – does not generate contradictory outcomes – then there will be 
some cases it cannot decide... If the scheme is comprehensive, it will generate 
inconsistent outcomes.106 
Moreover, so far as the Court is open to considering a range of perspectives on an 
interpretive question, its quest to find a coherent interpretive account that is consistent 
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with these varying modalities may provide some constraint on its exercise of 
discretion. Though it may be rare for the four modalities to prescribe a uniform result, 
the interactions between the different types of interpretive arguments may often point, 
on balance, in a particular interpretive direction. 
Constitutional interpretation, as Professor Vicki Jackson has observed, relies on 
‘judgment, not algorithm; it requires judicial self-discipline, located within a 
particular community’s interpretive traditions, and [is] based on an appreciation for 
the limited but important role of judges in a democracy’107. In seeking harmony 
between the settled expectations of the past and the evolving needs of a changing 
nation, the Court has embraced this multiplicity of constitutional arguments that seeks 
to accommodate and reconcile the divergent theories of constitutional justice that 
reflect the diversity in society. For the HRA to endure, the Court must continue to 
weave a legal narrative that conjoins the best in statecraft and adjudication, for that is 
the cardinal feature of Britain’s constitutional practice. 
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